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Abstract. Th e connection between emotions and ethical views or ethical inquiry has 
been considered intimate by a number of philosophers. Based on Peirce’s discussion on 
the emotional interpretants in MS 318, I will suggest that such interpretants could be 
exploited in ethical inquiry. I will fi rst argue, drawing on T. L. Short’s interpretation of 
Peirce, that there are fi nal emotional interpretants, and such emotional interpretants 
actually formed (or dynamical) can be more or less appropriate concerning the sign’s 
(dynamical) objects. I will then explore the prospect that emotional interpretants could 
be harnessed for the particular cognitive purpose of ethical inquiry, concluding that 
normative judgments based on feelings could serve as its observational part.
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Introduction
In MS 318, Peirce lays out one of his many trichotomies of interpretants: emotional 
interpretants are feelings, energetic interpretants actions, and logical interpretants 
thoughts (or ultimately habits) that interpret a sign. Peirce points out that “not all 
signs have logical interpretants, but only intellectual concepts and the like” (EP 2: 410). 
With his usual concentration on logical interpretants, Peirce appears to have given 
emotional interpretants a rather limited treatment. Th is does not however imply that 
such interpretants are of limited interest or useless for many, including cognitive ends. 
Indeed, in what follows I will suggest – following ways paved by T. L. Short (2008, 2015) – 
that emotional interpretants could be exploited for specifi cally scientifi c purposes, in 
particular in normative inquiry such as that of ethics.
According to Peirce’s other central trichotomy of interpretants, a sign’s immediate 
interpretant is the possibility of its interpretation; the dynamical interpretant an 
interpretant actually formed by some interpreter: and the fi nal interpretant the 
interpretant that would be formed by any interpreter (in some conditions), containing, 
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as Peirce somewhat cryptically points out, the “Sum of the Lessons” of the sign 
concerning its object. Accordingly, for any actually formed, dynamical emotional 
interpretants to reveal something concerning the sign’s object, there must be such 
things as fi nal emotional interpretants.
In order to explore the possibility of fi nal emotional interpretants, I will fi rst discuss 
T. L. Short’s account of the fi nal interpretant as the interpretant ideally adequate to the 
purposes of the interpretation of the sign, adjusting this account to fi t better some of 
Peirce’s accounts of the fi nal interpretant. I will then proceed to show that emotional 
interpretants, too, can serve such purposes of interpretation. Finally, I will argue that 
Peirce’s discussion of the emotional interpretants yields the prospect of harnessing 
such interpretants for a specifi cally cognitive purposes in ethical inquiry.
Emotional interpretants: immediate, dynamical and fi nal
To my knowledge, Peirce distinguishes emotional, energetic and logical interpretants 
by their names only in MS 318, and even there in passing. Emotional interpretants 
are feelings, energetic interpretants actions and logical interpretants thoughts (and 
ultimately, habits) that interpret a sign. Th is is how Peirce describes the fi rst, emotional 
interpretant:
Th e fi rst proper signifi cate eff ect of a sign is a feeling produced by it. Th ere is almost 
always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the 
proper eff ect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very 
slight. Th is “emotional interpretant”, as I call it, may amount to much more than 
that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper signifi cate eff ect 
that the sign produces. Th us, the performance of a piece of concerted music is a 
sign. It conveys, and is intended to convey, the composer’s musical ideas; but these 
usually consist merely in a series of feelings. If a sign produces any further proper 
signifi cate eff ect, it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, 
and such further eff ect will always involve an eff ort. (CP 5.475)
Another central Peircean division is that between the immediate, dynamical and fi nal 
interpretants. Th e immediate interpretant of a sign is its particular interpretability. 
Peirce’s wording already suggests that all signs have an immediate emotional 
interpretant, which consists at least of the potential interpretability of the sign. In 
turn, dynamical interpretants are the interpretants actually elicited in the interpreter. 
Maintaining that any further interpretants are elicited through the mediation of the 
emotional interpretant, Peirce suggests that feelings are inevitably brought about by 
any sign actually interpreted, whatever its type: thus all signs actually interpreted have 
dynamical emotional interpretants. In Peirce’s description, the dynamical emotional 
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interpretant is at least a feeling of interpretability; as we will see, it can be much more. 
Moreover, a dynamical energetic interpretant (“eff ort”) is required for the formation 
of a logical interpretant. 
Are there fi nal emotional interpretants? And if there are, are these possessed by 
all signs that produce dynamical emotional interpretants? A part of the problem in 
answering these questions is that the notion of a fi nal interpretant is far from clear: 
Peirce himself admitted, his notion of this third interpretant was “not yet clear from 
mist” (CP 4.536). Many of Peirce’s discussions of the fi nal interpretant suggest that 
such an interpretant cannot be emotional in nature: the interpretant is of the nature 
of conduct rather than feeling.
Th e Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any mind does act 
but in the way in which every mind would act. Th at is, it consists in a truth which 
might be expressed in a conditional proposition of this type: “If so and so were 
to happen to any mind this sign would determine that mind to such and such 
conduct.” By “conduct” I mean action under an intention of self-control. (CP 
8.315)
Here, however, Peirce does not distinguish between the fi nal interpretant and the 
ultimate logical interpretant of a sign. Th e latter interpretant is the logical interpretant 
that is not itself a sign (in the relevant respect) to another logical interpretant. Peirce 
argues that this interpretant is of the nature of a habit, the sort of disposition to 
conduct that may be described by the kind of conditional proposition he alludes to. 
Th is is the contention on which, in MS 318, Peirce’s defense of pragmatism rests.
Th e apparent identifi cation of fi nal and ultimate interpretants has sometimes been 
brushed aside as a matter of terminology. Peirce oft en equates the two terms, and as 
he concentrated on the logical interpretant we might assume that discussion of the 
fi nal emotional and energetic interpretants is simply omitted (see Short 2007: 184). 
However, at points it appears that Peirce identifi es the ultimate logical interpretant with 
the fi nal interpretant (see EP 2: 496–7). Indeed, it would not be far-fetched to assume 
that this problematic identifi cation is a key reason for his diffi  culties in making sense 
of the nature of both interpretants, especially the fi nal interpretant (as it is here called). 
Th e immediate interpretant is a “may be”, the possibility of interpretation, and 
the dynamical interpretant the actually formed response. Th e fi nal interpretant, in 
turn, is a general, or a “would be”. But which general? Peirce evidently runs together 
the notion that the fi nal interpretant is the response that would be formed, at least 
under some conditions to be specifi ed, in or by any interpreter (“the way in which 
every mind would act”) and the idea that the fi nal interpretant is of the nature of a 
habit (“a truth which might be expressed in a conditional proposition” of the habit-
describing type). In other words, Peirce does not distinguish between the would be 
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that is (somehow) the response of every interpreter (which does not imply that the 
response must be a habit) and the would be that is a habit of conduct (which does not 
imply that the habit would be formed in any interpreter). Th is distinction remaining 
muddled, the fi nal interpretant appears to be general in both ways: as the response 
elicited in any interpreter and as a habit of conduct.
In order for the fi nal interpretant to be an emotional one, and not a habit of conduct, 
we must assume that it is general in the fi rst of these ways: it is the response that would 
be elicited in any interpreter, not actually but in some conditions to be specifi ed.1 But 
which response? Any actual response (dynamical interpretant) or a set thereof formed 
cannot be meant, as the fi nal interpretant “does not consist in the way in which any 
mind does act”. By the fi nal interpretant, Peirce clearly means an interpretant that 
is ideal and never actualized in full. Th is is explained by Peirce’s other remarks in 
which he maintains that the fi nal interpretant would consist of everything that the 
sign could reveal about its object; as he puts it in a letter to William James, the fi nal 
interpretant is the “sum of the Lessons of the [sign], Moral, Scientifi c, etc.” (EP 2: 498). 
T. L. Short (2007: 182) quotes another typical remark from the Logic Notebook where 
Peirce holds that the fi nal interpretant (here referred to as the “normal” interpretant) 
is the interpretant “embracing all that the sign could reveal concerning the Object to 
a suffi  ciently penetrating mind”.
Th e fi nal interpretant, then, is not necessarily a habit. It is a general which has 
at least these three features: (1) it is the response that would be, in some conditions, 
elicited in every interpreter; (2) it is not actualized by any dynamical interpretant, at 
least in full; and (3) it consists of all that the sign could reveal concerning its object.
It oft en seems as if the fi nal interpretant were the whole truth concerning the sign’s 
object. Condition (3) seems to fi t uneasily with the notion of fi nal emotional and 
energetic interpretants. As T. L. Short has argued, Peirce oft en writes as if the fi nal 
interpretant were the whole truth concerning the sign’s object, but this concentration 
on truth, according to Short (2007: 190), does not “comport to the breadth of [Peirce’s] 
semeiotic”, which extends to signs which cannot be assessed in terms of truth and 
falsity. Short explains such remarks by arguing that the purpose Peirce predominantly 
had in mind was that of the scientifi c inquirer, for whom the whole truth would indeed 
be the fi nal interpretant of an intellectual sign. Other purposes for which signs may 
be interpreted – and interpretants which do not themselves admit of truth as falsity, 
such as actions and feelings – were thus largely neglected, but not denied, by Peirce.
1  Th e commentator raises the question of whether the fi nal emotional interpretant could 
itself be a habit. Th e answer is that it could not: what makes an emotional interpretant (even 
a fi nal one) emotional is that it is an emotion. However, the question is interesting in another 
respect: what if there are (not fi nal but) ultimate emotional interpretants which are habits of 
feeling? Th is would not be Peirce’s view, but possibilities of this sort should be explored.
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Attempting to rectify Peirce on this score, Short argues that the fi nal interpretant 
is the interpretant that would be “ideally adequate to the purpose for which the sign 
is being interpreted” (Short 2007: 190). As Short notes, there are thus diff erent fi nal 
interpretants of the same sign relative to the purpose of interpretation.2 
Short’s account makes sense of the fi nal interpretant as a would be in terms of its 
ideal adequacy. But making such adequacy relative to purpose, it also implies that the 
fi nal interpretant is not the response that would be (in part) elicited in any interpreter 
(1). For the same reason, the fi nal interpretant would not consist of everything that the 
sign can teach about its object (3). And contrary to (2), it also seems that a dynamical 
interpretant, if ideally adequate to the interpreter’s purposes, would actualize the 
fi nal interpretant (although this depends on how “ideal” the adequacy of the fi nal 
interpretant is taken to be).
Short provides a tangible idea of the fi nal interpretant by references to various 
interpretative purposes: this leaves room for the possibility of fi nal emotional and 
energetic interpretants. Also, Short’s interpretation can hardly be contested with 
respect to its account of Peirce’s concentration on logical interpretants. Nevertheless, 
it may underestimate Peirce’s own conception of the breadth of the fi nal interpretant 
(see also Short 2007: 195). Namely, the “sum of the Lessons” that Peirce identifi es with 
the fi nal interpretant should not be taken narrowly as the increase of knowledge: as 
Peirce’s words has it, the “Scientifi c” lessons are only some among many.
Th e solution that suggests itself is that the fi nal interpretant should not be limited 
with respect to this or that interpretative purpose (under these or those conditions of 
interpretation). Rather, it should be viewed as the sum (or set) of such responses that 
would be adequate with respect to purposes and conditions of interpretation. 
Th is account fi ts Peirce’s view that (1) the fi nal interpretant would be elicited in 
any interpreter under the same conditions: it encompasses any possible conditions 
and purposes of interpretation. It also explains why (2) the fi nal interpretant is never 
fully actualized: any actually formed response, even if adequate to the conditions and 
purposes at hand, only actualizes one aspect of the fi nal interpretant. Finally, (3) the 
fi nal interpretant indeed entails everything that the sign could reveal about its object: 
there indeed is just “one” fi nal interpretant for each sign, but that interpretant consists 
of a set of possible responses – the sum of the sign’s lessons, very broadly understood.
Provided that there are fi nal emotional, energetic and logical interpretants (a 
question to which I will return in the following section), they are all aspects of this 
fi nal interpretant, distinguished as to whether the response in question is of the 
nature of feeling, action or thought (or habit), respectively. If this is correct, Peirce’s 
confusion between the fi nal and ultimate logical interpretants is also easily explained. 
2  Following Short (2007: 188–189), we may enumerate signs by their immediate interpretants: 
the same thing can be many signs if it is diff erently interpretable in this manner.
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An ultimate logical interpretant of a sign – a habit – may actualize an aspect of the 
fi nal interpretant, if the habit is adequate to the interpreter’s purposes in those 
circumstances.
Purposes of interpretation and dynamical objects
Th e fi nal interpretant, I have argued, can be in part actualized by a dynamical 
interpretant by being adequate to the purposes of interpretation. If the purpose of 
interpretation is to learn or know the truth, the fi nal logical interpretant of a sign 
itself is a truth concerning the sign’s object. But this is not the only purpose a logical 
interpretant may adequately serve: such interpretants may be questions, problems as 
well as creative ideas such as those that produce pieces of fi ction. Similarly, energetic 
interpretants – actions – can obviously serve a variety of purposes, predominantly 
practical. However, the question of whether there are fi nal emotional interpretants 
still remains. What purpose could a feeling serve?
It could of course be pointed out that all interpretation of signs requires a purpose: 
there would be no interpretants without (interpretative) purposes, as T. L. Short 
(2007, Ch. 6) has forcefully argued. If there are emotional interpretants, which Peirce 
himself distinguished, there must be interpretative purposes that those interpretants 
may be appropriate to. However, against this view, it could be argued that emotional 
interpretants are adequate only by proxy in that their mediation is required for the 
other interpretants to form. Emotional interpretation could be understood as a stage in 
an interpretative process that leads to other types of interpretants (viz., energetic and 
logical), which then may or may not serve a purpose of the interpreter. Our question 
is thus more specifi c and pertains to whether the emotional interpretants themselves 
can serve an interpretative purpose.
Clearly there are such cases. Perhaps the simplest ones involve feelings sought 
for for their own sake. Our purpose, say, in going to the cinema is to experience 
feelings elicited by a fi lm (even if it usually is not our only purpose). Th e cinematic 
experience involves the interpretation of signs (of the fi lm) for this purpose. Emotional 
interpretants may also serve more particularly practical purposes. Perhaps one may 
wish to decorate a beautiful home, and revises one’s actions in decoration based on 
the feelings which imaginary and actual arrangements of colours and objects elicit.3
Finally, emotional interpretants elicited may also serve a cognitive purpose. Th e 
emotions elicited by a fi lm may attest to the qualities of the object presented in the 
fi lm, or the fi lm itself. As a fi lm may elicit a variety of feelings during its span and 
aft erwards, perhaps a simpler case would concern the taste of wine, which is itself an 
3 Th is is an example from Peirce to which we will briefl y return below.
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emotional interpretant attesting to its quality. Such emotional interpretants may be 
further exploited to arrive at a logical interpretant, such as a judgment concerning the 
quality of the fi lm or the wine. Oft en an emotional interpretant is rather immediately 
followed by such a judgment (analogously to how certain sensations are immediately 
followed by observational judgments). Importantly, however, no such judgments need 
be formed for the emotional interpretants to speak of the qualities of their objects.
In brief, emotional interpretants serve interpretative purposes by being feelings 
that (1) are sought for themselves; (2) serve a practical purpose; or (3) serve a cognitive 
purpose. Emotional interpretants may serve practical purposes by eliciting a further 
response which is an action or a thought – an energetic or a logical interpretant – and 
cognitive purposes by eliciting a thought; however, these further interpretants are not 
necessary for the emotional interpretant to serve the purposes enlisted. Sometimes, an 
emotional interpretant may be an integral part of the genuine nature of an energetic 
or a logical interpretant, for example when a moral judgment without a concomitant 
emotion (such as remorse) is as hollow as laughter (an energetic interpretant) without 
the feeling of amusement.
It is in order to disarm two potential misconceptions of the adequacy of inter-
pretants. Firstly, whether an interpretant can be considered adequate depends not on 
all of the interpreter’s purposes but on the one(s) for which the sign is being interpreted. 
Assume that you, upon my exclamation, jump in front of a moving car in order to 
save a child’s life, but happen to fi nd a winning lottery ticket instead. Your jump and 
the ensuing discovery may serve your other purposes (fi nancial ones) but still fail to 
actualize an aspect of the exclamation’s fi nal interpretant, if the child is not saved: 
the latter outcome was the purpose for which the energetic interpretant (the jump) 
was formed.
Secondly, it might seem that emotional interpretants cannot be more or less 
adequate to our interpretative purposes: an emotion, we might think, cannot be 
mistaken. Obviously, there is a sense in which a feeling is incorrigible: it does not 
admit of assessment in terms of truth and falsity. But this does not imply that the 
feeling cannot be more or less adequate as an interpretant of a sign. Th is point can be 
made by the most unlikely example, namely the feelings that are sought for in their 
own right. When going to the cinema, our purpose is not merely to experience joy, 
sadness, and so on, but to experience the emotions the fi lm conveys. Th is is precisely 
why our emotional responses count as interpretants of the signs that fi lm is composed 
of. (In contrast, the emotions caused by a drug designed specifi cally to make people 
happy would not be interpretants of a sign.)
In both cases just discussed, the adequacy of the interpretant does not simply 
depend on the interpreter’s purposes; it also depends on the nature of the sign’s 
dynamical object, the object “as it is regardless of any particular aspect of it, the Object 
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in such relations as unlimited and fi nal study would show it to be” (EP 2: 495).4 As 
all signs have fi nal interpretants, all signs also have dynamical objects: such objects 
are required to explain the discrepancy between dynamical and fi nal interpretants. 
A dynamical interpretant may be a completely inadequate response to the sign, in 
which case that interpretant does not actualize any part of the fi nal interpretant. But 
even when the dynamical interpretant is an adequate response, and hence actualizes 
an aspect of the fi nal interpretant, it will nevertheless do so only partially: there is 
always more a sign could reveal concerning its object.5
Emotional interpretants and ethical claims
I have argued that emotional interpretants – feelings – can serve a variety of 
interpretative purposes, and that their adequacy in serving those purposes ultimately 
depends on the nature of the dynamical objects of the signs of which they are 
interpretants. If this much is correct, there are fi nal emotional interpretants, and an 
actual feeling (a dynamical interpretant) can actualize an aspect of the fi nal emotional 
interpretant: the feeling can be adequate to an interpretative purpose with respect to 
the sign’s dynamical object. Feelings, then, can be more or less appropriate as responses 
depending, in part, on the dynamical object of the sign. Th is opens the possibility of 
treating feelings as an aspect of experience that itself can be revealing of the nature 
of those dynamical objects.
As we have seen, Peirce maintains that all interpretation of signs is founded on 
emotional interpretants, which are the fi rst responses in a chain that may further 
produce energetic and logical interpretants. However, the most interesting use that 
Peirce makes of emotional interpretants, at least in MS 318, concerns the development 
of purposes. He enlists feelings – either attractive or repulsive – as leading us to revise 
4  Sometimes, also in MS 318, it seems that Peirce connects the emotional interpretant with 
the sign’s immediate object, whereas the energetic and logical interpretants are connected with 
the dynamical object. It is however not immediately clear why the emotional interpretant 
would not be connected to the dynamical object quite as well as the other two interpretants. 
It may be that here Peirce does not make a clear distinction between the immediate and 
dynamical interpretants, the former of which is matched – indeed, in a sense identical – with 
the immediate object. I am indebted to Mats Bergman for discussions on this point.
5 Short defi nes the dynamical object as that which explains any discrepancy between the 
sign’s immediate and fi nal interpretants. In accordance with his interpretation of the fi nal 
interpretant, Short attempts to avoid the identifi cation of that interpretant with what “unlimited 
and fi nal study would result in” (Short 2007: 191). However, with the emendation to Short’s 
interpretation here proposed, there is no reason to avoid such identifi cation. Accordingly, as 
in the examples just discussed, we may understand the dynamical object as explaining any 
discrepancy between the dynamical and fi nal interpretants.
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our purposes by way of eff orts of reproducing them by way of similar conduct, drawing 
from an example of a builder who, with the “general purpose to render the decorations 
of a house he is building beautiful” makes “decorations in his inner world, and on 
attention to the results, in some cases experienced feelings stimulated him to endeavors 
to reproduce them, while in others [...] excited eff orts to avoid and modify them” (EP 2: 
431). Here we have emotional interpretants (feelings) leading to energetic interpretants 
(eff orts) which, by way of reiteration, bring about a logical interpretant (a purpose), 
serving the practical purpose of decoration.
Purposes, in Peirce’s view, are the mental states which entail or dictate the aims of 
self-controlled conduct; like habits, they are general. Th ey are thus the sort of mental 
states or dispositions that we would assume that a person who assents to, or sincerely 
asserts, a normative proposition would entertain. For this reason, as I have argued at 
more length elsewhere, they could be viewed as the ultimate logical interpretants of 
normative (as opposed to descriptive) judgments or propositions (Rydenfelt in press).6 
Th e development of purposes in light of feelings, as discussed by Peirce, is, by these 
lights, the revision of normative views of all stripes: moral propositions, logical rules 
of thought, conventional prescriptions, as well as what seem to be mere expressions 
of taste or preference.
Th e development of purposes, however, does not always require an ulterior 
purpose, whether practical – such as in the builder example – or cognitive. Sensations 
can sometimes lead to spontaneous and apparently uncontrolled descriptive 
judgments, oft en called observations. Similarly, normative judgments are sometimes 
brought about without control, such as when an emotional response instantly sparks 
an ethical judgment, itself a logical interpretant. (I will here stay neutral on whether 
judgments of a normative nature based on feelings should be understood as distinct 
from, or as a subclass of, such observations.) Witnessing some horrid action quite 
spontaneously leads to the judgment that what occurred was wrong, conveyed by an 
emotional interpretant (a feeling of indignation or the like). Of course, this is not the 
only source of our normative views, just like (other) observations are not the only 
source of our beliefs.
However, a prospect based on Peirce’s discussion is that feelings could be harnessed 
in order to revise our opinions, or exploited for specifi cally cognitive purposes. Th is 
concerns cases in which we attempt to ascertain whether something really is funny, 
depressing, cheerful, or the like; but more importantly to the issues at hand, the 
cognitive purposes might be those of ethical inquiry. Norms (statements concerning 
what should be) could be understood as analogous to theories (statements concerning 
what is or would be), both revisable based on experience, where the relevant experience 
6  Th is view runs counter to Peirce’s own claim, in MS 318, that a purpose is merely the 
“character” of a self-controlled habit.
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concerning norms is distinctly emotional in nature, dependent on attractive and 
repulsive feelings of moral pertinence, such as approval or indignation. In particular, 
moral norms, or general propositions concerning how we should act under certain 
conditions, could be understood by analogy to scientifi c laws, or propositions 
concerning what would occur in certain conditions.7
It might be retorted that feelings are “merely” subjective, and judgments based on 
them are culturally and socially laden; but the same is the case of sensations and the 
observations they found. Similarly, it could be argued that this approach to emotions 
as the experience founding certain judgments makes features such as rightness and 
wrongness (or cheerfulness or dullness) of the dynamical objects of signs dependent 
on our emotional reactions towards those signs. However, this would be mistaking 
the view proposed for a conceptual reduction of these features to our responses.8 
Consider again the analogy with “descriptive” observations. While our judgments of, 
say, whether stones are hard are based on sensations, the hardness of stones itself does 
not consist of those responses. Th ere is no apparent reason to think that the features 
of the dynamical objects that elicit our emotional responses are are fundamentally 
diff erent.
Th ere are, of course, salient diff erences between observations based on sensations 
and judgments based on feelings pertinent to, say, ethical inquiry. One such diff erence is 
that the latter kind of judgments do not (at least as of yet) allow for the sort of precision 
that could be brought about by the development of instruments of measurement. 
However, as T. L. Short (2008; see also Short 2015) has argued, Peirce himself made 
use of feelings for scientifi c purposes in his “Study of great men” conducted with his 
students at Johns Hopkins in 1883–1884, where the students assessed the greatness 
of historical individual on the basis of brief biographical sketches, on a scale of 1 to 
6, resembling the Ptolemaic classes of stellar magnitudes. Th e point of this study, as 
7 Th e commentator argues that “emotions should have a kind of propositional content, 
otherwise they would never be turned into judgments”. But this seems to me a non sequitur. 
Peirce distinguished between the percept (a secondness that professes nothing) and the 
perceptual judgment (a thirdness, a thought that “represents”) (see Bergman 2007). An 
emotion may be treated analogously to the percept and a normative claim to the perceptual 
judgment. Th ere is much debate on these issues in the philosophy of perception, of course, 
but almost everyone agrees that in perception or observation something that is not itself a 
judgment founds a judgment. In Peirce’s terms the percept is the non-judgment on which the 
perceptual judgment is based. If that is a viable approach, it can be extended to the relationship 
between emotions and normative judgments.
8 Indeed, it seems my commentator may be guilty of this mistake. I do not wish to propose 
that the emotionally “tractable” features of objects are themselves the same as, or dependent 
on, our emotional responses (or judgments based on them), any more than the hardness of a 
stone consists of, or is dependent on, our sensations (or judgments based on them).
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Peirce reports decades later, was to “explode the ordinary notions that mathematical 
treatment is of no advantage when observations are devoid of precision and that no 
scientifi c use can be made of very inexact observations” (CP 7.256).9
Another diff erence between descriptive and normative judgments appears to 
be that feelings that are relevant to normative judgments can be brought about by 
simple contemplation, while the sensations funding “descriptive” observations are 
less amenable to imagination, oft en requiring external experimentation. Both are 
nevertheless dependent on experience. For example, thought experiments concerning 
moral questions are indeed experiments: they are not mere deductions from a set of 
pre-existing background principles (or a priori), but funded by the feelings elicited 
by the contemplation of imaginary circumstances (or a posteriori).
Th e view here proposed can be further clarifi ed by some remarks on its relationship 
to moral sentimentalism.10 Sentimentalism can be understood as one, or a combination, 
of (at least) the following views concerning moral judgments: that such judgments 
(1) express emotions (emotivism); (2) are judgments concerning emotions; (3) are 
explained by emotions; and (4) are justifi ed by emotions. By the view at hand, making 
a moral judgment or holding a moral view is not to be in an emotional state or to 
express such a state (or 1): it is, rather, making a judgment like any other. Neither are 
moral judgments judgments about emotions: they do not concern or make reference 
to what emotions we do, could or should have (or 2). As a consequence, moral “facts” 
are not themselves facts about emotions. Th e latter two sentimentalist claims come 
closer to the view proposed, by which moral judgments may be sparked by emotions 
and indeed oft en seem to be. However, if sentimentalism requires that the explanation 
of moral judgments is always explained by an emotion (or 3), the view proposed 
does not insist on such an explanation: moral judgment need not arise with, or be 
accompanied by, a feeling. Th e source of moral judgments is oft en elsewhere, such as 
in what we have learned from others.
Th e sentimentalist view of the justifi cation (or 4) comes closest to the view 
proposed. Sentimentalists sometimes claim that emotions justify our moral judgments, 
oft en limiting the salient emotions to those that are suitably neutral with respect 
to individual interests. However, I have not suggested that the actual procedures of 
justifi cation of moral judgments that we engage in are always founded on emotions. 
9 Peirce’s notion of inexactness in this connection does not completely agree with the term’s 
common usage: it does not refer to a lack of discrimination on e.g. a scale but to the diffi  culty 
of arriving at an observational judgment (see Short 2008).
10 Th is and the following paragraph have been added as a response to the commentator, who 
raises the interesting question of the extent to which the view proposed here is a sentimentalist 
one, along the lines of Shaft esbury and Hume, pointing out that Peirce was not a sentimentalist 
and in any case not an emotivist. I agree that Peirce was not a Humean sentimentalist nor an 
emotivist, and I wish to defend neither view. 
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Quite the contrary, it seems clear that they oft en are not – say, in cases when people 
justify their moral views by referring to some moral authority, such as a religious text. 
Th e suggestion at hand is that emotions could be exploited in justifying moral opinion, 
and indeed systematically so, in ethical inquiry. Even here it must be emphasized that 
no emotion, as such, suffi  ces to justify a moral judgment any more than a sensation 
suffi  ces to justify a “descriptive” judgment; much more by way of auxiliary beliefs and 
hypotheses is required for an emotionally founded judgment to be taken to count in 
favour (or against) a moral view.
Conclusion
I have argued that there are such things as fi nal emotional interpretants: emotional 
interpretants can serve interpretative purposes. Whether they do so adequately – 
whether they succeed in serving interpretative purposes – depends, ultimately, on 
the signs’ dynamical objects. In this way, emotional interpretants can be revealing 
of those objects. Th e prospect that I then explored was that of harnessing emotional 
interpretants for a particular cognitive purpose, that of ethical inquiry. Analogously 
to the role played by descriptive judgments (or observations) funded by sensations 
in non-normative inquiry, normative judgments based on feelings can serve as the 
observational part of normative inquiry.11
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Эмоциональные интерпретанты и этический запрос
Связь между эмоциями и этическими взглядами интересовала многих философов. 
Основываясь на пирсовской трактовке эмоциональных интерпретант (MS 318), 
предлагаю использовать такие интерпретанты в исследованиях по этике. В начале 
статьи я утверждаю, следуя за Т. Л. Шортом, что существуют финальные эмоциональные 
интерпретанты. Те эмоциональные интерпретанты, которые фактически сформированы 
(динамичные интерпретанты), могут быть более или менее соответствующими 
(динамическим) объектам знака. Затем я исследую возможность использования 
эмоциональных интерпретант в этике с когнитивной целью, приходя к выводу, что 
основанные на чувствах нормативные суждения могут составить наблюдаемую часть 
подобного этического запроса.
Emotsionaalsed tõlgendid ja pärimine eetika järele
Emotsioonide ja eetiliste vaadete vaheline side ehk pärimine eetika järele on huvitanud 
mitmeid fi losoofe. Selle põhjal, kuidas Peirce (MS 318) käsitleb emotsionaalseid tõlgendeid, 
panen ette, et selliseid tõlgendeid saaks kasutada pärimises eetika järele. Kõigepealt väidan, 
lähtudes T. L. Shorti Peirce’i tõlgendusest, et on olemas lõplikud emotsionaalsed tõlgendid, 
sellised emotsionaalsed tõlgendid, mis on tegelikult moodustunud (või dünaamilised) ja 
võivad olla märgi (dünaamiliste) objektide suhtes rohkem või vähem kohased. Seejärel uurin 
võimalust, kas emotsionaalseid tõlgendeid saab rakendada eetika järele pärimise konkreetse 
kognitiivse eesmärgi huvides, jõudes järeldusele, et tunnetel põhinevad normatiivsed otsused 
võivad moodustada selle vaadeldava osa.
COMMENT:
A note on moral sentimentalism 
in the light of the emotional interpretant
Jean-Marie Chevalier12
Th is very nice paper on emotional interpretants and ethical inquiry suggests that moral norms 
might be somehow based on feelings. More precisely, it argues for the idea that emotional 
interpretants could be exploited in ethical inquiry. Th e broad thesis that ethics rests on a 
special kind of sentiments or feelings has been defended in the history of philosophy under 
the label of Moral Sentimentalism. Shaft esbury is one of its main supporters. He held that a 
“Sense of Right or Wrong” allows us to evaluate the “aff ection” behind actions, thus forming a 
second-order aff ection (Shaft esbury 2001[1699–1714]). What is this sensibility to the good and 
12 Author’s address: Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Yliopistonkatu 4, 
00100 Helsinki, Finland; e-mail: jeanmariechevalier@yahoo.fr.
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evil? Hume famously claimed that the so-called moral sense needs to be analysed as specifi c 
mechanisms, among which sympathy plays a fundamental role. 
In the wake of this, Henrik Rydenfelt seems to be proposing a view based on the Peircean 
analysis of the emotional interpretant. In his version, a feeling is not precisely a reason on 
which to base a moral judgment, but – if I understand it correctly – a reason for striving to 
reproduce some actions in order to reach a purpose13 (“leading us to revise our purposes 
by way of eff orts of reproducing them by way of similar conduct”). Th e idea that the logical 
interpretant of a normative proposition should be a purpose is palatable. In this view, feelings 
would help develop purposes, and thence, revise normative judgments. 
How do feelings work in this direction? Th e author’s example goes: the perception of a 
wrong action produces an emotional interpretant (namely, a negative emotion, e.g. disgust, 
indignation or fear), which “spontaneously leads” to a moral judgment (of disapproval). Th e 
author admits it does not mean that all our moral judgments are uncontrolled, but he seems 
inclined to view the spontaneous transition from feelings to judgments as the normal mode 
of formation of moral evaluation. It may be a bit unclear whether the author claims that we 
do most of the time base our moral assessments on feelings, or that we should “harness” them 
in order to achieve the purposes of ethical inquiry. 
Th e crux of such kind of a theory is of course to explain how normative judgments 
“spontaneously” proceed from feelings. Th e author is aware that making “features such as 
rightness and wrongness (or cheerfulness or dullness) of the dynamical objects of signs 
dependent on our emotional reactions” faces many objections. Th ey may be summed up in 
the celebrated Humean maxim that we cannot infer “ought” from “is”: in particular, what we 
ought to praise cannot be deduced from what we feel. Ethics is epistemically autonomous, and 
may not be derived from mere observation of inner (or outer) states. Nevertheless, one can try 
to elaborate on the analogy with empirical observation. 
Rydenfelt’s solution is exciting. He proposes that emotional interpretants might be 
conceived on the model of perception. To be true, gut reaction oft en precedes (and perhaps 
causes) moral judgments. But is the emotional response a perception? If so, it is required that 
emotions should have a kind of propositional content, otherwise they would never be turned 
into judgments – just like a judgment of observation requires that perceptions should have 
some sort of conceptual content. However, those who claim that emotions have intentional 
content must explain how emotions may be feelings and judgments at the same time – claiming 
for instance that they involve the judgment that their objects have the property which is the 
content of the emotion (e.g., that fear of a bear involves the judgment that the bear has the 
property of being frightening). Th e supporters of such representational theories also have to 
defi ne what we perceive in emotion – most of them arguing that emotions present values (e.g. 
Tappolet 2000). 
Th e analogy with perception drawn by Rydenfelt paves the way to an interesting alternative. 
As Peirce seems to have implied that the logical interpretant is all-embracing, all aspects 
(including emotional) should be accounted for within his model of scientifi c inquiry. On this 
basis, one can regard propositions about right and wrong “in analogy to scientifi c laws”: just 
like scientifi c laws are general propositions whose truth may virtually be tested by a practical 
13 As the author stipulates it, ‘purpose’ is here meant as the mental state equivalent to the aim 
of an action. 
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controlled procedure (relying on a real would-be), moral judgments would result from possible 
practical tests based on a specifi c kind of observation, namely the observation of emotions. It 
reveals that emotional interpretants should not be viewed as subjective feelings but as somehow 
general, a requirement that Hume had noticed: “‘Tis only when a character is considered in 
general, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, 
as denominates it morally good or evil” (Hume 1978[1739–1740]: 472). It does not imply that the 
whole theory of ethics should rest on feelings, but, as Rydenfelt puts it, “normative judgments 
based on feelings can serve as the observational part of such inquiry”.
One can only encourage the author to explore this direction, perhaps in working out the 
conception of emotion and feeling in the way Peirce did regarding perception, separating 
a percept from a percipuum and perceptual judgment. It parallels the concept, conception 
and conceptual judgment trichotomy. Would it be relevant to introduce diff erences between 
the felt, the “motuum” and the emotional judgment? At any rate, what is conveyed in the 
emotional interpretant is more than mere feeling: it is the whole meaning of an object that can 
be encapsulated in emotion. For that reason, the Peircean notion of emotional interpretant 
may help to circumvent some shortcomings of judgmental theories of emotion.
It seems to me that the view defended by Rydenfelt signifi cantly diff ers from Peirce’s 
own view (which of course is no argument against the former). It is true that Peirce regarded 
sentiments as fundamental in guiding one’s behaviour: “certain kinds of conduct, when the 
man contemplates them, have an esthetic quality. He thinks that conduct fi ne; and though his 
notion may be coarse or sentimental, yet if so, it will alter in time and must tend to be brought 
into harmony with his nature” (CP 1.591, 1903). Nevertheless, it is dubitable that Peirce was a 
moral sentimentalist in the Humean sense.14 Hookway (2000: 228) showed that Peirce had a 
cognitivist view of emotion and sentiment which forbids any ethical emotivism. It is true that, 
as the author writes: “A moral judgment without a concomitant emotion (such as remorse) 
is as hollow as laughter (an energetic interpretant) without the feeling of amusement”. But 
it does not imply that the moral judgment consists in the emotion. If not through emotion, 
how do we know what is good and bad according to Peirce? He was never very eloquent about 
that. Our “sensible heart” indeed makes “natural judgments” (W 8.188). But there may be a 
more conceptual way of telling the good from the evil. When explaining the role of icons and 
indices in predication, Peirce gives the following example: 
14 Peirce’s “apology for philosophical sentimentalism” does not exactly defend moral senti-
mentalism in the Humean sense. It is rather the view that philosophical rationalism is “a farce” 
(CP 1.631, 1898 = EP 2.32) because the rational reasons we provide to most of our choices are 
oft en a posteriori justifi cations. In this view, reason “appeals to sentiment in the last resort” (CP 
1.632, 1898) because most of our actions are guided by instinct. Without any paradox, it goes 
with the claim that not “any weight whatsoever” should be allowed to sentiment or instinct in 
theoretical matters (CP 1.634, 1898). Sentimentalism, when understood not as “the fashionable 
amusement to spend one’s evenings in a fl ood of tears over a woeful performance on a candle-
litten stage” (W 8.188) but as the true doctrine that “great respect should be paid to the natural 
judgments of the sensible heart” (W 8.188), “ought to lie at the cornerstone of all our conduct” 
(CP 1.662).
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Suppose, for example, I detect a person with whom I have to deal in an act of 
dishonesty. I have in my mind something like a ‘composite photograph’ of all the 
persons that I have known and read of that have had that character, and at the 
instant I make the discovery concerning that person, who is distinguished from 
others for me by certain indications, upon that index at that moment down goes 
the stamp of RASCAL, to remain indefi nitely. (CP 2.441, c. 1893)
It may not solve the problem of our sensibility to moral appraisal, but Peirce’s idea is that we 
form a moral judgment (a symbol) in voluntarily associating an icon with an object presented 
to us by an index. As Peirce oft en uses the metaphor of composite photographs to describe 
the way we form concepts, one can surmise mere sensibility is not enough for such a process 
to take place. 
Of course, one of the assets of Rydenfelt’s view is that the emotional interpretant is subtler 
than a feeling. Yet it makes it more mysterious too. As he argues that “there must be such 
things as fi nal emotional interpretants” and that “all signs actually interpreted have dynamical 
emotional interpretants”, one would like to fi nd an example of the “purest” kind of emotional 
interpretant. A mere “feeling of interpretability” is minimal. Maybe the interpretant of an 
instrumental piece of music would be fully emotional.15 Th rough it, no “signifi cation” is 
conveyed (nothing that could be expressed in a true or false proposition), and still, an adequate 
response may be expected: although “an emotion, we might think, cannot be mistaken,” feeling 
static on a waltz or depressed by Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy” would clearly be inadequate, not 
because it does not fi t with the composer’s intention, but because it does not fi t with music 
itself. T. L. Short’s defi nition that the interpretant should be “ideally adequate to the purpose 
for which the sign is being interpreted” (Short 2007: 190) posits a purpose which may be ethical; 
but in the case of a symphony, no such purpose exists. And as Rydenfelt notes, being relative 
to a purpose seems to prevent it from being elicited in any interpreter.
It raises the question of the absolute end of purely aesthetic signs (if any, perhaps such 
as instrumental music). Is it possible that their complete ultimate interpretant should be 
emotional? If so, what is the adequate end for a work of “pure” art? In Peirce’s pragmaticism, 
logic has a defi nite adequate end, which is its norm: truth as the fi nal opinion of the community. 
Ethics has too, namely self-controlled conduct. What about the end of aesthetics? It is one of 
the systems’ blind spot. Th e summum bonum, which is supposed to be the ground of any other 
norm, parallels the emotional interpretant, supposed to be part of any (dynamical) interpretant 
as its possibility. So the adequacy of an emotional interpretant (e.g. of a symphony) would 
be evaluated in comparing its object to the summum bonum. Th is may not be very helpful, 
though; anyway, it raises the question of what is the signifi cation of a sign, when its meaning is 
neither logical nor obviously practical. Th is may lead to a general theory of “natural dicisigns” 
(Stjernfelt 2014).
If the fi nal emotional interpretant is the adequate emotion felt when viewing or hearing 
(and, why not, tasting) a piece of art in particular, why could it not be a habit? Th e adequate 
15 Th e author gives the example of movies as a kind of entertainment where “feelings [are] 
sought for for their own sake”. But a movie is eminently complex, and requires a strong logical 
interpretation. As for the example of wine tasting, it raises the problem of the diff erence 
between feeling, sensation and emotion, with which I tried to deal (Chevalier 2007).
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interpretation should grow more and more steady and regular. It is true that habit usually 
belongs to Th irdness and logic. Furthermore, a habitual feeling probably would not be very 
emotional: it would lack spontaneity and eventually be dead. However, maintaining that an 
emotional interpretant may be a habit would reconcile fi nal interpretants with feelings. For 
if the interpretant is a response elicited in any interpreter, it seems to me that it must be a 
habit: if anyone behaves in the same way, it is a regularity that people behave so; and the 
multiplicity of agents all responding alike is equivalent to a single agent always responding 
alike. Th is separation of the would-be into two senses (common response and habit) does not 
seem necessary to me; it is my major point of resistance to the paper by Rydenfelt, which is 
otherwise extremely convincing.
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